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Newly developed long historical time series on public debt, along with modern data on external debts,
allow a deeper analysis of the cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises. The evidence confirms
a strong link between banking crises and sovereign default across the economic history of great many
countries, advanced and emerging alike. The focus of the analysis is on three related hypotheses tested
with both “world” aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. First, private debt surges are
a recurring antecedent to banking crises; governments quite contribute to this stage of the borrowing
boom. Second, banking crises (both domestic ones and those emanating from international financial
centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises. Indeed, we find they help predict them.
Third, public borrowing accelerates markedly ahead of a sovereign debt crisis; governments often
have “hidden debts” that far exceed the better documented levels of external debt. These hidden debts



















The economics profession has an unfortunate tendency to view recent experience 
in the narrow window provided by standard datasets.
1  It is particularly distressing that so 
many cross-country analyses of financial crisis are based on debt and default data going 
back only to 1980, when the underlying cycles can be half centuries and more, not just 
thirty years.
 2    
This paper attempts to address this deficiency by employing a comprehensive new 
long-term historical database for studying debt and banking crises, inflation, and currency 
crashes.
3  The data covers seventy countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, 
North America, and Oceania. 
4 The range of variables encompasses external and 
domestic debt, trade, GNP, inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity 
prices.
5  Our analysis spans over two centuries, going back to the date of independence or 
well into the colonial period for some countries.  The construction of our dataset builds 
on the work of many scholars; it also includes a considerable amount of new material 
from diverse primary and secondary sources.   
Exploiting the multi-century span of the data, we study role of repeated extended 
debt cycles in explaining the observed patterns of serial default and banking crises that 
characterize the economic history of so many countries—advanced and emerging alike.   
The focus of the analysis is on three related hypotheses that we document and formally 
                                                       
1 That is why an exception  such as Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963)  monumental monetary history of the 
United States still resonates almost one-half century after publication .   
2 For a longer perspective on crises, see the work of Bordo, Eichengreen, Lindert and Morton, and Taylor. 
3 This is the first formal application of the core dataset described in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and the 
scope of the dataset has been expanded significantly as well. 
4 See Appendix Table 1 for the full list of countries. 
5 External debt refers to debt that is legally governed by foreign law, in contrast to debt governed by the 
law of the issuing country.  This is the not the only way to parse the data, but it is a useful one empirically.   2 
test at both “world” aggregate levels and on an individual country basis.   First, private 
debt surges—fueled by both domestic banking credit growth and external borrowing are a 
recurring antecedent to domestic banking crises; governments quite often contribute to 
this stage of the borrowing boom.  (Banking crises in financial centers have also 
historically helped predict domestic banking crises elsewhere). Second, banking crises 
(domestic ones and those in international financial centers) often precede or accompany 
sovereign debt crises.  Third, public borrowing accelerates markedly and systematically 
ahead of a sovereign debt crisis (be it outright default or restructuring); the government 
often has “hidden debts” that far exceed the better documented levels of external debt.  
These hidden debts include domestic public debt (which prior to our data were largely 
undocumented) and private debt that become public (and “publicly” known) as the crisis 
unfolds.  Quantifying public contingent liabilities is beyond the scope of this paper.  A 
fourth related hypothesis (which we document but do not test) is that during the final 
stages of the private and public borrowing frenzy on the eve of banking and debt crises 
and (most notoriously) bursts of hyperinflation, the composition of debt shifts distinctly 
toward short-term maturities.
6 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes our approach toward 
cataloging, dating, and connecting the various manifestations of economic crises.  The 
concepts of serial default, debt intolerance, and the “this time is different syndrome,” 
which all play a central role in our analysis, are defined.  In Section III, we present the 
“big picture” on global cycles of debt, financial crises and sovereign debt crises.  We use 
representative country histories to elaborate and complement some of the patterns seen in 
the global aggregates.  The robustness of the descriptive analysis is grounded in a related 
                                                       
6  This is closely related to the themes in Rodrik and Velasco (2000).   3 
Chartbook that spans more than two centuries of data and documents the crisis 
experience and debt history of each and every one of the seventy countries that make up 
our sample.
7    The emphasis is on describing the broad phases of the debt cycle, the 
sequencing of crises, and some of their features—such as the duration and frequency of 
default spells.  History suggests that policymakers should not be overly cheered by the 
absence of major external defaults from 2003 to 2009 after the wave of defaults in the 
preceding two decades.  Given that international waves of defaults are typically separated 
by many years, if not decades, there is no reason to suppose that serial default is dead. 
Section IV discusses some alternative theoretical frameworks that might help 
explain the observed patterns discussed in the preceding section with a special emphasis 
on serial default and the “This time is different syndrome. Section V complements the 
descriptive “big picture” analysis in Section III by exploiting the rich panel dimension of 
our data to test for temporal causal patterns across crises and the role of public and 
private debts in the runup to sovereign debt and financial crises.  In the concluding 
section, we take up the issue of how countries can graduate from the perennial problem of 
serial default. 
 
II. Crisis Definitions and Other Concepts 
 
 We begin by developing working definitions of what constitutes a financial 
crisis, as well as the methods—quantitative where possible—to date the beginning and 
end of a crisis.  The boundaries drawn are generally consistent with the existing empirical 
economics literature, which by and large is segmented across the various types of crises 
                                                       
7 See Reinhart (2010), This “Time is Different Chartbook: Country Histories on Debt, Default, and 
Financial Crises” which will be henceforth referred to as the Chartbook.   4 
considered (e.g., sovereign debt, exchange rate).  Two approaches are used to identify 
crisis episodes.  One is quantitative in nature and is discussed, while the other is based on 
a chronology of events.  The crisis markers discussed in this section refer to individual 
countries as opposed to global events.  
1. Inflation, Hyperinflation, and Currency Crises 
Expropriation takes various forms, beyond outright default, repudiation, or 
restructuring of domestic or external debts.  Indirect routes to achieving the same end, 
inflation and currency debasement, can also erode the value of some types of existing 
debts.  Thus, we date both the beginning of an inflation or currency crisis episode and its 
duration.  Many of the high-inflation spells can be best described as chronic, in that they 
last many years.   
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), which classified exchange rate arrangements for the 
post–World War II period, used a twelve-month inflation threshold of 40 or higher 
percent to define a “freely falling” episode.  Our current work spans a much longer 
period, before the widespread creation of fiat currency.  Median inflation rates before 
World War I were well below those of the more recent period:  0.5 percent for 1500–
1799 and 0.7 percent for 1800–1913 versus about 5 percent for 1914–2009.  Accordingly, 
we define an inflation crisis using a threshold of 20 percent per annum.  
Hyperinflations, which are defined as episodes where the annual inflation rate exceeds 
500 percent, are of modern vintage.
8   Hungary 1946 holds the sample record despite the 
recent challenge from Zimbabwe, which comes in second.
9 
                                                       
8 Note that this definition of hyperinflation (unlike Cagan’s classic definition of a monthly inflation rate 
that s 50 percent  or greater) does not require monthly readings of inflation—which are scarce prior to the 
20
th century. 
9 See Figure 70 (Zimbabwe) in the Chartbook for a comparison of hyperinflation episodes.   5 
To date currency crashes, we follow a variant of Frankel and Rose (1996) and 
focus exclusively on exchange rate depreciation. This definition is the most 
parsimonious, as it does not rely on other variables, such as reserve losses (data that 
many central banks guard jealously) and interest rate hikes.
10  Mirroring our treatment of 
inflation episodes, an episode is counted for the entire period in which annual 
depreciations exceed the threshold of 15 percent per annum.   
Hardly surprising, currency crashes and inflation crises go hand in hand.  Figure 1  
FIGURE 1. The Tight Connection Between Currency Crashes and Inflation Crises: 
Emerging Markets, 1865-2009 
 
Emerging markets:
Correlations of the share



















60 Share of countries with an annual inflation rate above 20 % (shaded bars)
Share of countries with
 a currency crash





Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  An inflation crisis is defined as a year where inflation exceeds 20 percent, while a currency crash is 
an annual depreciation (devaluation) greater than or equal to 15 percent per annum.  The correlations of 
inflation and exchange rate crises are contemporaneous.   
                                                       
10 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for a more detailed discussion of indices that measure “exchange 
market turbulence.”   6 
 
plots the incidence of the two “monetary” or “fiat-money” varieties crises—exchange 
rate and inflation.  The “honor” for the record annual currency crash goes to Greece in 
1944, also a year of hyperinflation (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
2. Debt Categories and Debt Crises 
  External debt crises involve outright default on payment of debt obligations 
incurred under foreign legal jurisdiction, repudiation, or the restructuring of debt into 
terms less favorable to the lender than in the original.
11 
These events have received considerable attention in the academic literature from 
leading modern-day economic historians, such as Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, 
Marc Flandreau, Lindert and Morton, and Alan Taylor.
12  Relative to early banking 
crises, much is known about the causes and consequences of these rather dramatic 
episodes.  For post-1824, the dates come from several Standard and Poor’s studies.  
However, these are incomplete, missing numerous post-war restructurings and early 
defaults.  This source has been supplemented with additional information from Lindert 
and Morton (1989), Suter (1992) and Tomz (2006).  Of course, required reading in this 
field includes Winkler (1933) and Wynne (1951). 
While the time of default is accurately classified as a crisis year, there are a large 
number of cases where the final resolution with the creditors (if it ever did take place) 
seems interminable.  Russia’s default following the revolution holds the record, lasting 69 
years.  Greece’s default in 1826 shut it out from international capital markets for 53 
                                                       
11 Appendix Table 1 provides a brief glossary of the major categories of debt studied in this paper. 
12 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the scholars that have worked on historical sovereign 
defaults.   7 
consecutive years, while Honduras’s 1873 default had a comparable duration.   Looking 
at the full default episode is, of course, useful for characterizing the borrowing/default 
cycles, calculating hazard rates, etc.  But it is hardly credible that a spell of 53 years 
could be considered a crisis.  Thus, in addition to constructing the country-specific 
dummy variables to cover the entire episode, we also employ one where only the first 
year of default enters as a crisis. 
Information on domestic debt crises is scarce but it is not because these crises do 
not take place.  Indeed, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show, domestic debt crises 
typically occur against much worse economic conditions than the average external 
default.  Domestic debt crises do not usually involve external creditors, which may help 
explain why so many episodes go unnoticed.  Another feature that characterizes domestic 
defaults is that references to arrears or suspension of payments on domestic debt are often 
relegated to footnotes.  Lastly, some of the domestic defaults that involved the forcible 
conversion of foreign currency deposits into local currency have occurred during banking 
crises, hyperinflations, or a combination of the two; deposit freezes are also numerous.  
The approach toward constructing categorical variables follows that previously described 
for external debt default.  Like banking crises and unlike external debt defaults, the 
endpoint of domestic default is not always known.  
3.  Banking crises 
In dating banking crises, our analysis stresses events given the paucity of 
quantitative information.  For example, the relative price of bank stocks (or financial 
institutions relative to the market) would be a logical indicator to examine, but such time   8 
series are not readily available, particularly for the earlier part of our sample as well as 
for developing countries (where many banks are not publicly traded). 
If the beginning of a banking crisis is marked by bank runs and withdrawals, then 
changes in bank deposits could be used to date the crises.  This indicator would have 
certainly done well in dating the numerous banking panics of the 1800s.  Often, however, 
the banking problems do not arise from the liability side, but from a protracted 
deterioration in asset quality, be it from a collapse in real estate prices or increased 
bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector.  In this case, a large increase in bankruptcies or 
nonperforming loans could be used to mark the onset of the crisis.  Indicators of business 
failures and nonperforming loans are also usually available sporadically; the latter are 
also made less informative by banks’ desire to hide their problems for as long as possible.   
Given these data limitations, we mark a banking crisis by two types of events:  (1) 
bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or 
more financial institutions; or (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or 
large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of 
institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions.   
The main sources for cross-country dating of crises are as follows:  For post-1970, 
the comprehensive and well-known study by Caprio and Klingebiel—which the authors 
updated through 2003—is authoritative, especially when it comes to classifying banking 
crises into systemic or more benign categories.  For pre–World War II, Kindleberger 
(1989), Bordo et al. (2001), among others provide multi-country coverage on banking.     9 
For many of the early episodes it is difficult to ascertain how long the crisis lasted.  Many 
country-specific studies pick up banking crisis episodes not covered by the multicountry 
literature and contribute importantly to this chronology.   
4. The “this time is different syndrome” and other concepts 
Serial default refers to countries which experience multiple sovereign defaults 
(on external or domestic public or publicly-guaranteed debt—or both).  These defaults 
may occur five or fifty years apart; these may be wholesale default (or repudiation) or a 
partial default through rescheduling. 
Debt intolerance manifests itself in the extreme duress many emerging markets 
experience at debt levels that would seem quite manageable by advanced country 
standards.  “Safe” debt thresholds for highly debt intolerant emerging markets turn out to 
be surprisingly low, perhaps as low as fifteen to twenty percent in many cases, and these 
thresholds depend heavily on a country’s record of default and inflation.  Debt 
intolerance likely owes to weak institutional structures and a problematic political system 
that makes external borrowing a useful device for developing country governments to 
avoid hard decisions about spending and taxing and global investors rightly suspicious 
about the government’s motives.  Simply put, the upper limit to market access is lower 
when governments suffer from an intolerance to repayment but not to borrowing.   
The essence of the This time is different syndrome is simple.  It is rooted in the 
firmly- held belief that financial crises are something that happen to other people in other 
countries at other times; crises do not happen here and now to us.  We are doing things 
better, we are smarter, we have learned from the past mistakes. The old rules of valuation 
no longer apply.  The current boom, unlike the many previous booms that preceded   10 
catastrophic collapses (even in our country), is built on sound fundamentals, structural 
reforms, technological innovation, and good policy. Or so the story goes... 
III. The Big Picture and Country Histories 
What are some basic insights one gains from this panoramic view of the history of 
financial crises?  Our approach throughout this section is to illustrate each of our main 
findings with both a “big picture” based on cross-country aggregation and a 
“representative country case study (or case studies)” from country histories.  Each of the 
main points highlighted in the figures is complimented by the pertinent debt/GDP-crisis 
indicator regressions reported at the bottom of each figure.  We begin by discussing 
sovereign default on external debt (that is, when a government defaults on its own 
external or private-sector debts that were publicly guaranteed.)   
1. Sovereign Debt Crises 
For the world as a whole (more than 90 percent of global GDP represented by our 
dataset), the current period can be seen as a typical lull that follows large global financial 
crises.  Figure 2 plots for the years 1800 to 2009 (where our dataset is most complete) the 
percentage of all independent countries in a state of default or restructuring during any 
given year.  Aside from the current lull, there are long periods where a high percentage 
of all countries are in a state of default or restructuring.  Indeed, there are five 
pronounced peaks or default cycles in the figure.    The first is during the Napoleonic 
War. The second runs from the 1820s through the late 1840s, when, at times, nearly half 
the countries in the world were in default (including all of Latin America).  The third 
episode begins in the early 1870s and lasts for two decades.  The fourth episode begins in 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and extends through the 1950s, when nearly half of all   11 
countries stood in default.
13  The most recent default cycle encompasses the emerging 
market debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s.  
FIGURE 2.  Global Sovereign External Default Cycles: 1800-2009 
Share of countries in default or restructuring 
 







60 Years during which at least 20% 
of sample countries are in default
 (shaded) 
Share of countries in default 
(or restructuring)
 
Sources: Lindert and Morton (1989), Macdonald (2003), Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff, 
and Savastano (2003), Suter (1992), and Standard and Poor’s (various years). 
Notes: Sample includes all countries, out of a total of 70 listed in Appendix Table 1, that were independent 
states in the given year. Specifically, the number of countries increases from 19 in 1800 to 32 in 1826, as 
Latin American colonies gained independence; following World War II, newly-independent Asian states 
swell the number to 58 and in the following decades as African nation-sates are born the number of 
sovereign increases to a total of 70—the full sample. 
 
Public debt follows a lengthy and repeated boom-bust cycle; the bust phase 
involves a markedly higher incidence of sovereign debt crises.  Public sector borrowing 
surges as the crisis nears.  In the aggregate, debts continue to rise after default, as arrears 
                                                       
13 Kindleberger (1988) is among the few scholars who emphasize that the 1950s can be viewed as a 
financial crisis era.   12 
accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.
14  Figure 3 plots the incidence of default shown 
in Figure 2 (now shaded bars) from 1824, when the newly independent Latin  
FIGURE 3. Sovereign Default on External Debt, Total (domestic plus external) Public Debt, and 





















Percent of countries in default or restructuring
(pale bars, left axis)
Total public debt/GDP, world average
(in percent, solid line, right axis)
Percent of
 countries
 with annual 
inflation over 20%
(dark bars, left axis)
 
Dependent variable  World: Share of countries in default or restructuring 
Sample  1824-2009 
Independent variables  OLS (robusterrors)    Logit (robusterrors) 
World: Public debt/GDP (t-1)  0.346    0.008 
p-value    0.000    0.000 
Number of observations  184    184 
R
2    0.224    0.246 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The debt aggregate for the world is a simple arithmetic average of individual countries’ debt/GDP ratios.  
For a few countries the time series on debt and exports are much longer dating back to the first half of the 19
th 
century than for nominal GDP.  In these cases (Brazil, Canada, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Thailand, Turkey and 
Uruguay) the debt/GDP series was spliced (with appropriate scaling) with the to the available debt/GDP data.  
The split between advanced and emerging economies is made along the present-day IMF classification.  
 
                                                       
14 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) on evidence on output behavior before during and after debt crises.   13 
American economies first entered the global capital market, through 2009 against an 
unweighted average debt/GDP ratio for all the countries for which such data is available.  
Upturns in the debt ratio usually precede the rise in default rates, as the regressions for 
the world aggregates shown at the bottom of Figure 3 confirm.  The evident positive 
correlation between rising debt burdens and higher incidence of default will be 
investigated more systematically in Section V.  Periods of higher indebtedness are also 
associated with a higher incidence of inflation crises (a more indirect form of default, 
highlighted as a darker shaded bar where the incidence of inflation exceeds that of 
default). Default through inflation is more prevalent since World War I, as fiat money 
became the norm and links to gold eroded. 
Figure 4 presents the comparable time series and regression analysis for emerging 
markets.  The pattern between debt and default are along the lines already discussed in 
the context of the world aggregate shown in Figure 3. 
15 
Serial default is a widespread phenomenon across emerging markets and 
several advanced economies.  Figure 1 anticipates this point by the numerous episodes 
(shaded) in which at least 20 percent of the independent nations were in default.  The 
most compelling evidence on serial default comes from the individual country histories, 
shown here for Brazil and Greece in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.  The 70 country 
histories presented in the Chartbook provide broad-based evidence that serial default cut 
across regions and across time. 
The “hallmark” surge in debt on the eve of a debt crisis, banking crisis or both are 
quite evident in most of the episodes in the timeline for Brazil and Greece’s last two 
                                                       
15 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b), for evidence on the debt thresholds that are associated with higher 
inflation outcomes.   14 
defaults in 1894 and in 1932—the latter default spell lasting about 33 years from 
beginning to its eventual resolution in 1964. 
FIGURE 4.  Sovereign Default on External Debt, Total (domestic plus external) Public Debt, and 
Inflation Crises: Emerging Markets, 1866-2010 




















100 Total public debt/GDP, emerging 
markets average
(in percent, solid line, right axis)
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 emerging market 
countries
 with annual 
inflation over 20%
(dark bars, left axis)
Percent of emerging markets in default 
or restructuring
(pale bars, left axis)
 
Dependent variable  Emerging Markets: Share of countries in default or restructuring 
Sample  1866-2009 
Independent variables  OLS (robusterrors)    Logit (robusterrors) 
Emerging Markets: Public debt/GDP (t-1)  0.232    0.007 
p-value    0.000    0.000 
Number of observations  144    144 
R
2    0.120    0.133 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The debt aggregates for the emerging economies is the simple arithmetic average of individual countries’ 
debt/GDP ratios.  See additional notes to Figure 3.   15 
 FIGURE 5. Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009 

























Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: For 1824-1945, public external debt; for 1946-2009 external debt is the aggregate of public and 
private debts. Only the major banking crises are shown. There are a total of 9 default episodes but only 8 
shaded regions, as two episodes occur in consecutive years (see table below). Only systemic banking crises 
are shown. 
 























1828-1834  7  1986-
1987 
1890  1988-1990  26.6  26.1 
1898-1901  4  1990  1897  1992-1994     
1902-1910  9    1900  or     
1914-1919  6    1914  single      
1931-1933  3    1923  episode     
1937-1943  7    1926  1988-1994     
1961  1    1929       
1964  1    1963       
1983-1990  8    1985       
    1990       
    1994       
Number of episodes:           
9    2  11  2(1)     
   16 
FIGURE 6. Greece:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1848-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 

























Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























48.1  12.7 
1843-1859  17    1991       
1860-1878  19           
1894-1897  4           
1932-1964  33           
Number of episodes:           
5    1  2  1     
   17 
Another noteworthy insight from the “panoramic view” is that the median 
duration of default spells in the post–World War II period is one-half the length of 
what it was during 1800–1945 (3 years versus 6 years, as shown in Figure 7). 
 
FIGURE 7. Duration of Default Episodes: 1800-2009 










Median is 6 years
1946-2009
169 episodes
Median is 3 years
Sources: Lindert and Morton (1989), Macdonald (2003), Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff, 
and Savastano (2003), Suter (1992), Standard and Poor’s (various years) and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  The duration of a default spell is the number of years from the year of default to the year of 
resolution, be it through restructuring, repayment, or debt forgiveness. The Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test for 
comparing the equality of two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions at the one 
percent significance level. 
 
A charitable interpretation is that crisis resolution mechanisms have improved 
since the bygone days of gun-boat diplomacy.  After all, Newfoundland lost nothing less 
than her sovereignty when it defaulted on its external debts in 1936 and ultimately 
became a Canadian province; Egypt, among others, became a British “protectorate” 
following its 1876 default.  A more cynical explanation points to the possibility that,   18 
when bail-outs are facilitated by the likes of the International Monetary Fund, creditors 
are willing to cut more slack to their serial-defaulting clients.   
The fact remains that, as Bordo and Eichengreen (2001) observe, the number of 
years separating default episodes in the more recent period is much lower.  Once debt is 
restructured, countries are quick to releverage (see Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 
2003, for empirical evidence on this pattern).  
2.  Banking crises   
Prior to World War II, serial banking crises in the advanced economies were 
the norm; as the larger emerging markets developed a financial sector in the late 
1800s—these economies joined the “serial banking” crisis club.  This pattern of 
frequent banking crises during the 19
th and early 20
th centuries is illustrated with 
Belgium’s chronology since 1800, but is systematically documented in Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), the Chartbook. 
The world’s financial centers, the United Kingdom, the United States and France 
stand out in this regard, with 12, 13, and 15 banking crisis episodes, respectively.  The 
frequency of banking crises drops off markedly for both the advanced economies and the 
larger emerging markets post–WWII.  However, all except Portugal experienced at least 
one post-War crisis prior to the current episode.  When the present wave of crises is fully 
factored in, the apparent drop will likely be even less pronounced.   Indeed, as discussed 
in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), despite dramatic differences in recent sovereign default 
performance, the incidence of banking crises is about the same for advanced economies   19 
as for emerging markets.  It also should be noted that as financial markets have developed 
in the smaller, poorer economies, the frequency of banking crises has increased.
16 
FIGURE 8. Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and  
Banking Crises, 1835-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









First year of banking crises 
(black lines) 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown. 
 
Ahead of banking crises, private debts (external debt, broader private capital 
inflows, domestic bank debt) also display a repeated cycle of boom and bust—the run-
up in debts accelerates as the crisis nears.   
It is certainly true that having debts (public or private) is a prerequisite to default.  
However, what we are describing here is not a tautology.  The pattern that emerges is not 
indicative of a gradual (linear) accumulation in debt in advance of a banking crisis or a 
sovereign default. Specifically, when we discuss rising debts ahead of the crisis we are 
                                                       
16 As already acknowledged, our accounting of financial crises in poorer countries may be incomplete, 
especially for earlier periods, despite our best efforts.   20 
referring to surges in capital inflow (bonanzas as defined in Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008) 
or, more generally, in any kind of debt (domestic or external). This nonlinear pattern in 
borrowing ahead banking and debt crises (as these often overlap) is documented in its 
multiple manifestations in Figures 9 through 13.  
Total external debt (public plus private) of emerging markets over 1970-2009 is 
presented in Figure 9. The shading indicates the incidence of default while the black bars 
represent the incidence of systemic banking crises.  The regressions (shown at the bottom 
of  Figure 9) confirm what the visual inspection of the time series plotted in the figure 
suggest.  Increases in external debt systematically help predict increases in the share of 
countries in default and the comparable share of emerging markets with systemic banking 
crises.  The small inset in Figure 9 also depicts a similar surge in public and private 
external debts (comparably defined) for the 22 advanced economies in our sample over 
the decade leading to the global financial crisis which began with the subprime debacle in 
the United States in 2007.  In effect, the average external debt/GDP ratio doubles during 
this period. The year 2008 is the advanced-economy counterpart to the years 1981 and 
1998 for emerging markets, that is the years.  An extensive number of episodes that are 
documented in the Chartbook display this “prototype” pattern. One of the most dramatic 
external debt buildups recorded since World War II is that of Iceland, shown in Figure 10 
for the 1922-2009 period. 
   21 
FIGURE 9. Gross External Debts (public and private), Sovereign Default and Systemic 
Banking Crises:  Advanced Economies (inset only) and Emerging Markets, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
Advanced economies, 
1999-2009



























(in percent, solid line, right axis)
Percent of countries
 with systemic banking crises
(black bars, left axis)
Percent of countries in




Dependent variable  Emerging Markets: Share of countries in default or restructuring 
Sample  1971-2009 
Independent variables  OLS (robusterrors)    Logit (robusterrors) 
Emerging Markets:  
External debt/GDP (t-1) 
 
0.574 
   
0.013 
p-value    0.000    0.000 
Number of observations  39    39 
R
2    0.615    0.595 
Dependent variable  Emerging Markets: Share of countries in systemic banking crises 
Sample  1971-2009 
Independent variables  OLS (robusterrors)    Logit (robusterrors) 
Emerging Markets:  
External debt/GDP (t-1) 
 
0.383 
   
0.007 
p-value    0.000    0.000 
Number of observations  39    39 
R
2    0.479    0.514 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations.   22 
FIGURE 10. Iceland:  External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009 
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
In light of the preceding discussion of the time profile of external debt before, during and 
following debt and banking crisis, it is hardly surprising that capital flows display the 
boom-bonanza phase in the years prior to the crisis and the Dornbusch-Calvo-type 
sudden stop syndrome just before or during the year of the crisis (even in crises episodes 
of an earlier century and in advanced economies). 
17  Figures 11 and 12 show public and 
private capital flows from the United Kingdom to Latin America and the United States, 
respectively, for 1865-1914.  As before, the first year of a banking crisis is marked by a 
                                                       
17That is, capital inflows to an emerging market economy suddenly dry up as global investors shun the 
country, as explained in Calvo, Izquierdo, and  Loo-Kung (2006), for example.   23 
black line (bar); in the The US experience during 1865-1913, shown in Figure 12, 
exemplifies this behavior.  
  
FIGURE 11. Latin America: Private and Public Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, 
Default and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of UK exports) 
Number of new banking crises and new or ongoing defaults for:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, 1865-1914
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Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes:  Only the first year of banking crises (black lines) and defaults (light line) are shown in the top panel 
of the figure.  The bottom panel tallies the number of banking and currency crises for the six countries that 
are capital inflow recipients. If each of the six countries had both a banking crisis and default (new or 
ongoing) the sum of these would be 12; the year with the largest number of crises is 1890 during the 
Barings episode.  Exchange rate crashes and inflation crises (which often coincide with default and banking 
crises) are not included in these calculations. 
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FIGURE 12. United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 











Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 
Like every other measure of indebtedness that we could find, domestic credit 
climbs sharply prior to the banking crisis and unwinds afterward.  Figure 13 provides 
more than one example fom Norway’s banking crises.  Other comparable examples 
populate country histories in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a), including the buildup of 
household debts almost across the board in OECD countries in the years immediately 
prior to the eruption of the global crisis in 2007-2008.  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
investigated the pre-banking crisis (and currency crash) runup and subsequent contraction 
in the domestic credit aggregates (as a percent of GDP).  The most comprehensive in terms 
of country coverage is Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who find most booms are followed by   25 
currency crises, banking crises or both.  Their results are along the lines of the observations 
made here. 
FIGURE 13. Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004 
(Amount outstanding at year-end as a percent of GDP) 
















3. Banking and debt crises 
   Banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises.   
The reasons for this temporal sequence may be the contingent liability story emphasized 
by Diaz Alejandro (1985) and formalized in Velasco (1986), in which the government 
takes on massive debts from the private banks, thus undermining its own solvency.
18  The 
currency crashes that are an integral part of the “twin crisis” phenomenon documented by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) would also be consistent with this temporal pattern.  If, as 
they suggest, banking crises precede currency crashes, the collapsing value of the 
                                                       
18  See Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) for a framework that is consistent with these dynamics.   26 
domestic currency that comes after the banking crisis begins may undermine the solvency 
of both private and sovereign borrower who are unfortunate enough to have important 
amounts of foreign currency debts.  
Even absent large scale bailouts (and without counting the post-crisis new 
government guarantees), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a and b) argue that, largely owing to 
collapsing revenues, government debts typically rise about 86 percent in the three years 
following a systemic financial crisis, setting the stage for rating downgrades and, in the 
worst scenario, default.  Other possible explanations are contemplated in the next section, 
which reviews the theoretical literature on crises with an eye to emphasizing frameworks 
that are most helpful in shedding light on some of the empirical regularities described in 
this section. 
   A causal chain from sovereign debt crisis to banking crisis, perhaps obscured in 
these simple graphs, cannot be dismissed lightly.  Financial repression and international 
capital controls may give the government scope to coerce otherwise healthy banks to buy 
government debt in significant quantities. A government default, in those circumstances, 
would directly impact the banks’ balance sheet.  The two crises may be more or less 
simultaneous.  But even if banks are not overly exposed to government paper, the 
“sovereign ceiling” in which corporate borrowers are rated no higher than their national 
governments may make banks’ offshore borrowing very costly or altogether impossible.  
The result would be sudden stop that could give rise to bank insolvencies either 
immediately or subsequently.  
Ultimately, the issue of temporal precedence is an empirical one that will be 
discussed in more detail in Section V.   27 
FIGURE 14. Sovereign Default on External Debt, Total (domestic plus external) Public 
Debt, and Systemic Banking Crises: Advanced Economies, 1880-2010 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
Years during which 25% or more
of advanced economies  
  entered the first year of a
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Dependent variable  Advanced Economies: Share of countries in default or restructuring 
Sample  1880-2009 
Independent variables  OLS (robusterrors)    Logit (robusterrors) 
Advanced Economies:  
Public debt/GDP (t-1) 
 
0.209 
   
0.002 
p-value    0.000    0.000 
Number of observations  130    130 
R
2    0.176    0.167 
Dependent variable  Advanced Economies: Share of countries in systemic banking crises 
Sample  1880-2009 
Independent variables  OLS (robusterrors)    Logit (robusterrors) 
Advanced Economies:  
Public debt/GDP (t-1) 
 
0.057 
   
0.002 
p-value    0.002    0.006 
Number of observations  130    130 
R
2    0.047    0.050 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The debt aggregates for the advanced economies and the world are simple arithmetic averages (not 
weighted by a country’s share in world GDP) of individual countries’ debt/GDP ratios.  For a few countries the 
time series on debt and exports are much longer dating back to the first half of the 19
th century than for nominal 
GDP.  In these cases (Brazil, Canada, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay) the debt/GDP 
series was spliced (with appropriate scaling) with the to the available debt/GDP data.  The split between 
advanced and emerging economies is made along the present-day IMF classification, even though several 
countries, such as New Zealand, were “emerging markets” during most of the pre-World War I period.    28 
FIGURE 15. Share of Short-term Gross External Debt (public plus private):  
Emerging Markets, 1970-2009 
(in percent) 
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
4.  Observations on the composition of debts 
To shed light on the maturity composition of external debt (public and private) 
around financial crisis in aggregate, Figure 15 plots the share of short-term debt during 
1970-2009 for emerging markets, where our external debt data is most complete.  The 
vertical lines single out years in which the incidence of banking crises (black lines) and 
sovereign defaults (shaded) was highest (20 percent or more of all countries were 
engulfed in crisis).  Consistent with Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) famous model of 
banking crises, short-term debts escalate on the eve of banking crisis; the ratio of short-
term to total debt about doubles from 12 to 24 percent.  A similar pattern emerges in the 
runup to sovereign defaults (which in this particular exercise immediately follows 
banking crises).  Many individual crises episodes are equally, or possibly even more,   29 
compelling; see Figure 16 on Indonesia.  The small table inset in Figure 10, which shows 
external debt for Iceland over 1922-2009, also reveals striking increase in the share of 
short-term debts as the crisis approaches, rising from about 17 to 49 percent.  In the 
march toward hyperinflation, it is not unusual to see long-term debts disappear altogether.  
Several episodes from the country histories (including the famous German hyperinflation 
of 1923-1924) corroborate this pattern.  The inset to Figure 5 on the eve to hyperinflation 
in the late 1980s Brazil is yet another entry in this long list.  
Private debts become public debts-after the crisis.  Several examples from the 
debt crisis that engulfed Latin America in the early 1980s and lasted a decade are 
documented in various figures in the Chartbook. 
19 Along the lines shown in Figure 15 
(inset), the pre-crisis surge in indebtedness is in private sectors. 
 
IV. Theoretical Underpinnings of “This Time is Different” Syndrome 
  Our results beg the question of how to explain the remarkable universality of 
serial default and serial financial crises across time, place, cultures, institutions and 
political systems.  As such, the roots are almost surely buried deep in human and social 
behavior, in areas where modern economics has only scratched the surface.  
Nevertheless, existing economic theory provides important suggestive results. 
                                                       
19 See for instance, the experiences of El Salvador and Ecuador, in which nearly all post crisis debts were 
public.    30 
FIGURE 16. Indonesia:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1911-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
"Hidden debts" on
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Sources: Reinhart (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
1. Multiple Equilibria Rationales 
Multiple equilibrium models, and related refinements, would appear to offer an 
explanation of one central feature of the “This Time is Different” syndrome: it is ypically 
much easier to identify when an economy is vulnerable to a financial crisis than to assess 
the probability or the timing of the collapse.  The generic multiple equilibrium model is a 
variant of Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) analysis of bank runs.  Their analysis suggests 
that any entity that uses short-term borrowing to fund holdings of illiquid assets (from 
construction loans to future tax revenues) can be vulnerable to crises of confidence 
(runs).  Models that explain government debt crises as arising from multiple equilibria 
include Sachs (1984), Calvo (1988), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, ch. 6), among 
others.  In addition to bank runs and sovereign debt crises, there is also a large literature   31 
suggesting multiple equilibria models of inflation and exchange rate crises (e.g., 
Obstfeld, 1994.) 
  At one level, the multiple equilibria explanation of the “This Time is Different” 
syndrome has some very attractive features. Multiple equilibria in financial markets, 
especially debt markets, is fairly generic, and therefore consistent with the near 
universality of crises. The buildup in short term debt we observe on the eve of financial 
crises (perhaps to economize on interest rate costs as debt rise) is certainly consistent 
with a multiple equilibrium story. During the boom, politicians and investors could 
misinterpret a “high-trade” outcome among a set of potential equilibria as evidence of 
permanently changed circumstances.  With such a “This Time is Different” mentality, 
they would not recognize that the economy has its back to a proverbial cliff, until it is too 
late.  Moreover, sunspot triggers to such crises, as they may be related to investor 
confidence, could potentially hit many countries at once. 
  Unfortunately, multiple equilibria models have their limitations.  Absent a model 
of the underlying sunspots, it is difficult to assess the degree of risks across different 
economies. True, there have been important efforts to refine multiple equilibria models to 
strengthen their explanatory power starting with Morris and Shin (2001), but the results  
can  be sensitive to difficult-to-confirm underlying assumptions, such as the importance 
of public relative to private information. 
2. Short term biases the allow crisis risks to build up 
  But even setting aside the difficulty of testing or applying multiple equilibrium 
models of financial crises, they beg the deeper question of why politicians, regulators, 
and indeed voters, do not take steps to reduce their economy’s vulnerability.  Why don’t   32 
the politicians who take on huge foreign debt burdens better incorporate the long-term 
risks to stability and growth?  Why, as debt burdens grow, do politicians prefer to shift 
borrowing to shorter maturities (to save on interest payments) rather than promote early 
adjustment to reduce risk of catastrophe?  Why is regulation so often pro-cyclical when 
towards the end of a boom when it should be obvious that financial regulation typically 
needs to become stricter not easier? If economies with high levels of short-term debt are 
particularly vulnerable, why do governments sometimes seem to adopt tax and financial 
policies that seem to promote it? 
  Although it does not address the exact question here, there is certainly an 
important political economy literature on debt bias.  For example, Alesina and Tabellini 
(1989) as well as Persson and Tabellini (1990) develop models where incumbents tend to 
run large deficits essentially because the temporary nature of their term in office raises 
their effective discount rate.  In a related approach, Amador (2008) argues that 
contemporaneous competition by different interest groups can lead to a “tragedy of the 
commons” situation in which short term expenditures are favored at the expense of 
longer term fiscal sustainability.  Amador (2002), building on Laibson (1997), shows 
how politicians’ limited horizons can fundamentally change the market for sovereign 
debt.  Recent quantitative analyses of sovereign default, including for example Aguiar 
and Gopinath (2006), suggest that high discount rates for governments are a key element 
of any cogent explanation of the borrowing and default cycle.   
Other political economy factors can also be important in explaining short-termism 
in financial governance, as we argued in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  During a boom, 
the financial sector becomes richer and more influential.  Often the result is reduced   33 
regulation that raises the financial sector’s profitability at the expense of greater crisis 
risk for society as a whole. 
3. Hidden debt 
Our results here, as well a plethora of vivid examples from the accompanying 
chartbook suggest that more attention needs to be paid to “hidden debt and liabilities.”  In 
a crisis, government debt burdens often come pouring of out the woodwork, exposing 
solvency issues about which the public seemed blissfully unaware.  One important 
example is the way governments routinely guarantee the debt of quasi-government 
agencies that may be taking on a great deal of risk, most notably as was the case of the 
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States.  Indeed, in many 
economies, the range of implicit government guarantees is breathtaking.  As we 
emphasize in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 and 2010), many governments find in a crisis 
that they are forced to deal not only with their external debts (owed to foreigners) but 
those of private domestic borrowers as well.  Famously, Thailand (1997), just prior to its 
financial crisis, kept hidden its massive forward exchange market interventions that 
ultimately led to huge losses. Even for plain vanilla government debt, governments rarely 
make it easy to obtain the kind of time series data one would require to meaningfully 
assess vulnerability (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  Hidden debt has loomed large in many 
sovereign defaults over history.  At the time of this writing one only has to read the 
debacle in the financial press concerning Greece’s hidden debts conveniently facilitated 
by its underwriter Goldman Sachs. For many more comparable examples, the interested 
reader is referred to Winkler (1933).   34 
  In principle, of course, lenders should realize the huge temptation for borrowers to 
hide the true nature of their balance sheet. Private information on debt can, in principle, 
be incorporated into models.
20  However, the many different margins on which 
governments can cheat are a significant complicating factor.  In any event, the 
importance of hidden debt in many financial crises suggests further work is need to better 
understand it role in the “This time is different” syndrome. 
4. Further models of leverage and behavior 
  Our list of potential crisis models is far from complete. For example, Fostel and 
Geanokplos’s (2008) analysis of leverage cycles is another potentially promising avenue 
of research.  
Even taking together all these promising strands of the political economy and 
financial crisis literature, one suspects there are still large gaps in our understanding of 
the arrogance and ignorance that underlie most financial crises—to reiterate a reading of 
Winkler (1933) is highly recommended.  The ignorance, of course, stems from the belief 
that financial crises happen to other people at other times in other places.  Outside a small 
number of experts, few people fully appreciate the universality of financial crises.  The 
arrogance is of those who believe they have figured out how to do things better and 
smarter so that the boom can long continue without a crisis.
21  Here modern behavioral 
economics can hopefully contribute new perspectives.  For example, Kahenman, Slovic 
and Tversky (1982) provides examples of overconfidence in the sense of underestimating 
the variability of future shocks.  Such false confidence could lead agents to hold 
insufficient buffer stocks of assets, or equivalently, to hold too much debt.  Alternatively, 
                                                       
20 An early attempt to model borrowing when lenders do not know aggregate debt is Kletzer (1984). 
21 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), ch. 1 for examples of “This Time is Different” mentality over the ages.   35 
leaders and votes may simply be overconfident (for example, as suggested by Camerer 
and Lovallo, 1999.)
22  We do not pretend to be able to synthesize all these diverse 
literatures, but clearly the “This Time is Different Syndrome” is an extremely important 
phenomenon (a “hardy perennial,” as Kindelberger would remark about financial crises) 
that needs further clarification and study. 
 
V. Debt, Banking Crises and Default: Cross-country Evidence 
  In Section III, we presented evidence based on both cross-country aggregates and 
individual country histories that suggested a strong connection between debt cycles and 
economic crises. Specifically, we noted that: (i) public debts rise markedly as a sovereign 
debt crisis draws near; (ii) private debts exhibit a similar nonlinear build-up ahead of 
banking crises; and (iii) public debts may or may not contribute to the pre-crisis surge in 
indebtedness on the eve of banking crises.  Furthermore, banking and debt crises often 
occur simultaneously (or in close proximity of one another) and, more often than not, 
banking crises anticipate (temporally preceded) debt crises. 
In this section, we investigate these postulated relationships more systematically.  
We also test the hypothesis that systemic financial crises in global financial centers (the 
United Kingdom and the United States) potentially increase the odds of a banking crisis, 
debt crisis, or both in other countries. Our rich panel data spans 70 advanced and 
emerging economies over a period of more than 200 years (1800-2009).  The full sample 
includes 290 banking crises and 209 sovereign default episodes; there are a total of about 
14,700 observations.  Recognizing that a sample that stretches over such a long horizon is 
                                                       
22 The authors are grateful to David Laibson for suggesting these references.   36 
bound to be riddled with structural change, we are careful to reexamine the relationships 
of interest over several subperiods. 
1. Banking and debt crises: Temporal patterns 
   The causal direction between banking and debt crises can potentially run in either 
or both directions.  As noted earlier, the prevalent pattern emerging from the country 
histories appears to suggest that banking crises come before the debt crisis. The causality 
tests employed here mimic the spirit of the standard vector autoregression (VAR) setup.  
Both variables (banking and debt crises dummies) are treated as potentially endogenous, 
which can be explained (or not) by its own lagged values and the lagged values of the 
second variable. We include as additional (exogenous) regressors the financial crisis 
dummy for the global financial center and allow the intercept to vary depending on 
whether the country is advanced or an emerging market.   
The first twist to the standard VAR is that both variables are dichotomous, so our 
preferred method of estimation is a multinomial logit; the second twist is that to reduce 
collinearity rather than include multiple lagged terms, we use a single lag of a three-year 
backward looking moving average. Hence, our simple two-equation system is given by, 
(1)  DCt  = βk  + β11 DCt-1 to t-3  + β12 BCt-1 to t-3  +  β13 FCt + u1t 
(2)  BCt  = βk  + β21 DCt-1 to t-3  + β22 BCt-1 to t-3  +  β23 FCt + u2t 
 
where BCt , and  DCt  are dummy variables that take on a value of one in the first year of  
a domestic banking crisis and the first year of a sovereign debt crisis, respectively.  
BCt-1 to t-3 , and  DCt-1 to t-3  are three-year moving averages of the two crises variables,     37 
βk , k = AE, EM  is the intercept term for advanced economies (AE) and emerging 
markets (EM).  The financial center crisis is given by FCt  and u1t and u2t  are the error 
terms.   
Variations of the model presented in (2) that restrict the intercept to be the same 
for all countries, that allow the intercept to vary by region, incorporate a fixed effect  for 
all 70 countries were also estimated but were not reported to conserve space.
23  In 
addition to logit, (1)-(2) were estimated using OLS and OLS with robust errors.  The 
results described in what follows were consistent across specifications and estimation 
strategies. 
Table 4 reports the results for the specification given by (1)-(2) for the full sample (1804-
2009), 1900-2009, and 1947-2009.
24  Significant coefficients are shown in bold italics (p- 
values) are reported in all cases.  The main results, irrespective of which sample period or 
estimation strategy is selected, is that systemic banking crises in financial centers help 
explain domestic banking crises and domestic banking crises help explain sovereign 
default. 
2. Public and external debt, default and banking crises 
      Beyond the causal pattern between the three dichotomous events considered, we 
now include as a regressor in equations (1) and (2) a debt/GDP measure.  For the longer 
sample, it is total public debt (domestic plus external) PD_Yt; for the post-1970 period we 
also consider external (public plus private debt) for the emerging market sub-group, 
                                                       
23 We also estimated the same model for the full crisis period—rather than the first year only.  The main 
result was that the lagged dependent variables came in significant; this is hardly surprising in light of the 
fact that both banking and debt crises are mostly multi-year phenomenon. 
24 Other subsamples are available from the authors upon request.   38 
ED_YEMt.  In all cases, we consider the change in the relevant debt/GDP ratio, ∆PD_Yt; 
from (t to t-2). 
  Adding the public debt variable does not alter any of the aforementioned temporal 
patterns. Banking crises in financial centers are still significant in the domestic banking 
crisis equation, as Table 5 highlights. Debt crises remain statistically insignificant. The 
three-year change in public debt/GDP only enters the banking crisis equation 
significantly for the most recent 1947-2009 subsample.  In effect, on the basis of a careful 
review of the country histories that connect banking crises to surges in private debt—
these results are not surprising.  
  Turning to the debt crisis equation, domestic banking crises continue to be a 
significant predictor of debt crises, while crises in the financial center have no direct 
independent effect (obviously, there is an indirect link through systematic relationship 
with domestic banking crises). Surges in public debt, have the significant expected 
positive effect on the likelihood of default, although it appears that the relationship is 
somewhat weaker for the 1947-2009 subsample. 
  External (public and private) debt for the period over which this data is available 
(1970-2009) significantly increases the chances of a banking crisis but had no systematic 
direct impact on the probability of default, which continues to depend significantly on 
whether there is a banking crisis or not. 
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TABLE 4. Temporal Patterns of Banking Crises and Sovereign Default: 
Multinomial Logit (robusterrors) Alternative Specifications, Panel Data 
 
 





First year of a banking crisis 
Explanatory variables:  Sample period 
  1824-2009  1900-2009  1946-2009 
Banking crisis  (t-1 to t-3)  0.251  -0. 092  -0.383 
p-value    0.237  0.892  0.276 
Default (t-1 to t-3)  -0.753  -0.327  -0.315 
p-value    0.708  0.441  0.417 
Financial center crisis (t to t-2)  3.320  4.238  3.749 
p-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Advanced economy intercept  -3.834  -3.616  -4.030 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Emerging market intercept  -4.245  -3.935  -3.720 
p-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  13,206  7,810  4,473 
Number of positive observations     281     212  128 
R
2  0.060  0.080  0.052 
 





First year of  a default 
Explanatory variables  Sample period 
  1824-2009  1900-2009  1947-2009 
First year of a banking crisis  







p-value    0.000  0.000  0.001 
Default (t-1 to t-3)  0.542  0.560  1.097 
p-value    0.064  0.000  0.000 
Financial center banking crisis (t 
to t-2) 
0.967  0.767  -1.470 
p-value    0.102  0.176  0.176 
Advanced economy intercept  -5.480  -6.441  -- 
p-value  0.000  0.000  -- 
Emerging market intercept  -4.241  -4.047  -4.022 
p-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  13,206  7,810  4,473 
Number of positive observations     203  140  92 
R
2  0.043  0.070  0.051 
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TABLE 5. Public Debt, Banking Crises, and Sovereign Default: 




First year of a banking crisis 
Explanatory variables:  Sample period 
  1824-2009  1900-2009  1946-2009 
Banking crisis (t-1 to t-3)  -1.882  -1. 837  -1.994 
p-value    0.016  0.034  0.083 
Default (t-1 to t-3)  -1.600  -1.866  -01.210 
p-value    0.145  0.111  0.336 
Financial center crisis  (t to t-2)  4.431  4.238  3.510 
p-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 
∆ Public debt/GDP (t to t-2)  0.003  0.003  0.003 
p-value  0.127  0.069  0.050 
Advanced economy intercept  -3.554  -3.541  -4.030 
p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Emerging market intercept  -3.586  -3.530  -3.720 
p-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  5,986  4,931  3,343 
Number of positive observations     221     181  116 
R
2  0.060  0.080  0.052 
Dependent 
variable: 
First year of  a default 
Explanatory variables  Sample period 
  1824-2009  1900-2009  1947-2009 
Banking crisis (t-1 to t-3)  1.909  1.978  2.680 
p-value    0.012  0.001  0.003 
Default (t-1 to t-3)  1.406  0.560  1.097 
p-value    0.113  0.000  0.000 
Financial center crisis (t to t-2)  0.902  0.767  -1.218 
p-value    0.102  0.176  0.075 
∆ Public debt/GDP (t to t-2)  0.004  0.003  0.003 
p-value  0.025  0.028  0.090 
Advanced economy intercept  -6.576  -7.261  -- 
p-value  0.000  0.000  -- 
Emerging market intercept  -3.823  -3.781  -4.022 
p-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  5.986  4,931  3,343 
Number of positive observations     104  95  72 
R
2  0.042  0.070  0.051 
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TABLE 6. External Debt, Banking Crises, and Sovereign Default: 
Multinomial Logit (robusterrors), Panel Data 
 
  1974-2009 
Explanatory variables:  Dependent Variable: First year of a 
    Banking 
crisis 
Default 
Banking crisis (t-1 to t-3)    0.218  0.004 
p-value      0.000  0.391 
Default (t-1 to t-3)    -0.042  0.018 
p-value      0.115  -0.051 
Financial center crisis  (t to t-2)    0.781  -0.051 
p-value      0.016  0.004 
External debt/GDP (t-1)    0.001  0.001 
p-value    0.000  0.152 
Intercept    0.060  0.043 
p-value      0.000  0.000 
Number of observations    1,496  1,496 
Number of positive observations      85   55 
R
2    0.295  0.012 
 
 
V. Concluding observations 
 
Our analysis has documented some of the links between public and private debt 
cycles and the recurrent pattern of banking and sovereign debt crises over the past two 
centuries.  Banking crisis are importantly preceded by rapidly rising private indebtedness.  
But banking crises (even those of a purely private origin) directly increase the likelihood 
of a sovereign default in their own right (according to our findings) and indirectly  as 
public debts surge.  There is little to suggest in this analysis that these debt cycles and 
their connections with economic crises have changed appreciably over time. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1. DEBT GLOSSARY 
 
External Debt:  total liabilities of a country with foreign creditors, both official (public) and private. 
Creditors often determine all the terms of the debt contracts, which are normally subject to the jurisdiction 
of the foreign creditors or to international law (for multilateral credits). 
 
Total government debt (total public debt):  total debt liabilities of a government with both domestic and 
foreign creditors. The “government” normally comprises the central administration, provincial 
governments, federal governments and all other entities that borrow with an explicit government guarantee. 
 
Government domestic debt:  all debt liabilities of a government that are issued under--and subject to--
national jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the creditor or the currency denomination of the debt 
(therefore it includes government foreign currency domestic debt, as defined below). Terms of the debt 
contracts can be market determined or set unilaterally by the government. 
 
Government foreign currency domestic debt:  debt liabilities of a government issued under  national 
jurisdiction that are nonetheless expressed in (or linked to) a currency different from the national currency 
of the country. 
 
Central bank debt:  Not usually included under government debt (despite the fact that it usually carries an 
implicit government guarantee). Central banks usually issue such debt to facilitate open market operations 
(including sterilized intervention).  Such debts may be denominated in either local or foreign currency. 
 
Domestic debt: liabilities of the public and private sector under domestic law. These are comprised of 
government domestic debt (see above) and private debts, which for most countries in our sample are 
dominated by debts of households and firms contracted through domestic banking institutions.  In our 
analysis we do not include data on non bank domestic debts (i.e. domestic corporate bonds and commercial 
paper). 
Hidden debt:  This is not an accounting definition as in previous categories of debt.  Hidden debt includes 
contingent liabilities of the government these could be (i) explicit guarantees (in which case they are not 
entirely hidden).  While we have not come across any public debt time series that quantify such guarantees, 
more recent measures of government guarantees are now published under the International  Monetary 
Funds  Standard Data Dissemination System (SDDS) framework; (ii) implicit guarantees which could 
extend to all kinds of private sector debts.  (iii) Debts of the central bank (see above).  (iv) Off-balance 
sheet debts that arise from transactions in derivative markets.   (v) Last, but not least, any liability of the 
government not included in official debt statistics  (thus official statistics would understate true public 
sector indebtedness) not already included in (i)-(iv) above.  After all, if we knew what these debts were, 
they would not be hidden. (see discussion in Section IV) 
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  Appendix Table 2. Countries, Regions, and Year of Independence 
 
Country  Year of Independence 
If post 1800 
Country  Year of Independence 
If post 1800 
Africa    Latin America   
Algeria  1962  Argentina  1816 
Angola  1975  Bolivia  1825 
Central Africa Republic  1960  Brazil  1822 
Cote D’Ivoire  1960  Chile  1818 
Egypt  1831  Colombia  1819 
Ghana  1957  Costa Rica  1821 
Kenya  1963  Dominican Republic  1841 
Mauritius *  1968  Ecuador  1830 
Morocco  1956  El Salvador  1821 
Nigeria  1960  Guatemala  1821 
South Africa  1910  Honduras  1821 
Tunisia  1591/1957  Mexico  1821 
Zambia  1964  Nicaragua  1821 
Zimbabwe  1965  Panama  1903 
Asia    Paraguay  1811 
China    Peru  1821 
Hong Kong *    Uruguay  1811 
India  1947  Venezuela  1830 
Indonesia  1949  North America   
Japan    Canada  1867 
Korea *  1945  United States   
Malaysia *  1957  Oceania   
Myanmar  1948  Australia  1901 
Philippines  1947  New Zealand  1907 
Singapore *  1965     
Taiwan *  1949     
Thailand *       
Europe       
Austria       
Belgium *  1830     
Denmark *       
Finland *  1917     
France       
Germany       
Greece  1829     
Hungary  1918     
Iceland  1918     
Ireland  1921     
Italy  1569     
Netherlands *       
Norway *  1905     
Poland  1918     
Portugal       
Romania  1878     
Russia       
Spain        
Sweden       
Switzerland       
Turkey        
United Kingdom        
Sources:  Correlates of War (2007).  
 